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Korea's economic development within recent years has begun
to attract the interest of Western economists with an enthusiasm
simmiliar to that heretofore shown the Japanese management style.
Two countries that have similiar characteristics such as
overpopulation, poor resources, and Confucian tradition, might
also have similiar management styles. However, the behavior
pattern of Korean businessmen has several characteristics which
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differ from their Japanese counterparts. Interestingly, many of
these differences result from a dissimiliar degree of Confucian
influences. Accordingly, Korea has evolved its management
system during a transition period influenced by traditional
Confucianism, Japanese practice, and the American system. _ For
the foreseeable future, the Korean business environment will
consist of a management style which is oriented comparatively
more Japanese, than American. This paper first overviews, then
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Korean economic development within recent years has
begun to attract the interest of Western economists with an
enthusiasm similiar to that heretofore shown the Japanese
management style. Two countries that have similiar charac-
teristics such as overpopulation, poor resources, and
Confucian tradition, might also have similiar management
styles. However, the behavior pattern of Korean businessmen
has several characteristics which differ from their Japanese
counterparts. Interestingly, many of these differences
result from a dissimiliar degree of Confucian influences.
Accordingly, Korea has evolved its management system during
a transition period influenced by traditional Confucianism,
Japanese practices, and the American system. For the
forseeable future, the Korean business environment will
consist of a management style which is oriented compara-
tively more Japanese, than American. This paper first over-
views, then compares the management styles of Japan and
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In 1980, Japan's gross national product (GNP) was the
third largest in the world. By the year 2000, it could have
the world* s largest GNP, if the current trends are main-
tained [Ref. 1:p.20]. Japan has virtually no physical
resources, yet it supports over 115 million people and has
come to dominate in one selected industry after another. In
the case of automobiles, the Japanese produced fewer than
one hundred thousand passanger cars in 1958, but by 1980,
Japan's eleven automakers produced eleven million cars, half
of which were exported to the rest of the world [Ref. 2:
p. 11].
Much of the above is true in the case of Korea. In
1978, twenty-five years after the end of the Korean War,
Korean firms started to take business away from large
western European companies, especially in the Middle East.
Korean construction firms, with Korean workers, are
competing successfully against such well known American
firms as the Fluor Corporation, which has done business in
Saudi Arabia since 1936 (Ref. 3: p. 16]. The growth rate of
Korean business, averaging 10 percent annually for the
decade 1967-1977, reached 13 percent in 1978. Additionally,
the gross national product approached $60 billion with per
capita income surpassing $1500 in 1930 as compared to a mere
$100 in 1962 when the economic drive began [Ref. 4: p. 23].
Numerous studies have been conducted concerning the
cultural background and other factors affecting Japanese
economic success. The unique style of Japanese management
has also been thoroughly analyzed by many western

researchers. Despite the similarity of cultural background
and the close geographical location of Korea and Japan,
there are some basic differences in management style between
the two countries. The lifetime employment system of big
Japanese firms, for example, is hardly found in the Korean
firms today.
Since few studies have been mads on the Korean manage-
ment style in spite of its explicit contribution to the
remarkable growth rate of the Korean economy for the last
two decades, this study will focus on the cultural back-
ground, and general characteristics of Korean management,
after first reviewing Japanese management style.
B. ECONOMIC SUCCESS
1 . Japan
When the Allied Occupation ended in 1952, Japan had
almost recovered to its pcewar levels of production. Its
Gross National Product was, however, little more than one-
third that of Prance or the United Kingdom. By the late
1970s, the Japanese Gross National Product was as large as
that of the United Kingdom 1 s and France's combined, and more
than half the size of the United States. The Japanese were
producing approximately as much steel as the United States,
but in more modern and efficient plants. With more modern
plants and higher productivity, Japanese steel was seriously
competing with American steel in America as well as foreign
markets. Making good use of its comparative advantage in
labor costs, economies o f scale, modern technology and
organization, Japan built up many differentiated and highly
competitive industries.
By the 1970s, Japanese products dominated the world
market in many areas. The Japanese watch industry eclipsed

the famous Swiss watch industry. The British motorcycle
industry was virtually eliminated by their Japanese counter-
part and the German dominance in camera and lens production
before World War II has given way to Japanese production.
In optical equipment, the Japanese are similarly dominant,
and the sales of Steinway and other American piano manufac-
turers have been no match for Yamaha. Japanese dominance
extended into such diverse fields as bicycles, ski equip-
ment, snowmobiles and cut pottery. In the late 1970s, as
the cost of new Japanese ships ran 20 to 30 % lower than
European ones, European countries were forced to resort to
non-market mechanisms to limit the number of ships purchased
from Japan. Japan dominated consumer electronics including
television, music sets, and video systems.
The modernization of facilities and productivity
increases, not cheap labor, are more important in explaining
Japanese superiority. In 1975, one Japanese car worker
could produce about one thousand pounds worth of cars every
nine days, to produce the same value, an English worker took
fourty-seven days. In 1976, none of the major European car
producers, such as Fiat, Renault or Volkswagen , were able
to produce as many as twenty cars per man-year of labor, but
Nissan employees produced forty-two cars per man-year and
Toyota turned out forty- nine. In 1962, the Japanese
produced roughly one hundred tons of steel per worker,
compared to four hundred in England; but by 1974, Japanese
productivity in steel was estimated to be two to three times
that of England.
In international trade the Japanese have had to
learn to communicate in English and to adopt patterns of
trade developed and originally dominated by western coun-
tries. Despite these obvious disadvantages, the Japanese
have begun to dominate international commerce as they domi-
nate industrial production.

Considering its limited space, limited natural
resources, and its crowding, Japan's achievements in
economic productivity and areas such as educational stan-
dards, health, and control of crime are in a class by them-
selves. This success is more striking when one considers
how far behind Japan was in many of these areas, not only in
1945, but even in the mid-1950s, after recovery from World
War II was essentially completed [Ref. 2: p. 9-23].
2. Korea
It took thirteen years for Japan to increase its
annual export of goods from two to tan billion dollars (1955
to 1967) . Korea managed the same task in five years (1973
to 1977). It took the Japanese another four years, until
197 1, to clear the 24 billion dollar level. In a world
which is now considerably more brutal, even more colored by
protectionism, and with a population hardly one third of
Japan's, Korea managed the ten to twenty-four billion dollar
step almost equally fast (4.5 years) [Ref. 5: p. 35].
Korean economic development did not really begin
until the early 1960s - Japanese occupation from 19 10 until
the end of World War II, then the division of the country,
the Korean War and reconstruction all precluded any substan-
tial progress. This changed rapidly in the 1960s.
The Korean economy has sustained high level economic
growth since the 1960s. During the nineteen years from 1962
to 1980, the Korean economy maintained an 8.8 percent annual
average growth rate, more than double that of the world's
major economies. That attainment was founded on rapid
industrialization and export growth. The yearly average
growth rate of the mining and manufacturing industries
amounted to 15.9 percent, and commodity exports grew by




Since the implementation of the First Five Year
Economic Development Plan in 1962, Korea*s industrial struc-
ture has shifted toward that of the industrialized econo-
mies. Shipbuilding developed rapidly from the building of
wooden fishing vessels in the 1960s to producing two million
gross tons in 1980. Shipbuilding capacity reached 4.25
million gross tons in 1981 mainly through the expansion of
the Hyundai shipyard, already one of the largest single
shipyards in the world [ Ref . 6: p. 115].
The electronics industry has grown faster than any
other industry in Korea during the past several years and is
being developed as one of the major export industries of the
future. In 1979, Korea produced $3.3 billion worth of elec-
tronic goods and has become the tenth largest producer of
electronics in the world.
Steel production: until 1973, when the Pohang Iron
and Steel Company Ltd. (POSCO) was completed, Korean
industry was seriously hampered by a lack of iron and steel.
ks of 1979, annual steel production had risen to 8,037,867
tons, U, 400, 000 tons of which were produced by POSCO and the
rest by other steel mills. Korea now ranks among the top 20
countries in the world in steel production [Ref. 6: p. 116].
Since it has the strong will and the ability to
develop the economy with a highly productive, well educated
and low-cost labor force, there is little doubt that Korea
will achieve great success in its economy by the 1990s.
C. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
As previously -observed, Japan, an overcrowded country,
with less than a fifth of its land level enough to permit
agriculture or other economic exploitation, is superior to
many advanced western countries in many respects, particu-
larly in industrial competitiveness [Ref. 7:p.5].
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What are the major reasons for the success of the
Japanese economy? Many distinguishied writers on the
subject have found their answers in Japanese managerial
skill. Is the same answer applicable in the case of Korea,
a country that has about the similiar population density,
rate of mountainous area and Confucian background? If it is
not the case, what differences can be noted between Korean
management and Japanese management? What factors are
considered to be important in Korean 1 s behavioral patterns?
Answering the above questions is the basic purpose of this
paper.
Japanese management style will be reviewed first,
followed by Korean management style. To compare styles of
management, the historical and cultural backgrounds of each
society need to be thoroughly studied.
D. METHODOLOGY
The approach taken in this research is to (1) study
Japanese management systems by examining relevant articles
and books, (2) evaluate the Korean management system by
examining relevant articles and books plus inclusion of the
author's personal experiences gained through a lifetime in
Korea, (3) compare the two styles by reviewing the major
characteristics of each system and (4) examine the reasons
for the differences between the two countries.
12

II. JAPANESE M A NAG EM ENT
When the United States was unquestionably the most
advanced industrial country in the early post-war period,
the Japanese were eager to learn about American management
techniques. They were willing to aake the assumption that
American management techniques were the most advanced. In
this chapter, special features and characteristics of
Japanese management, previously suggested by distinguished
researchers will be reviewed.
A. IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE
1 . Group Learning and Qual ity Control (OjC) Circles
During the "management boom" of the 1950s, the
American management formulas and techniques were introduced
into all spheres of Japanese business administration; parti-
cularly personnel administration. The degree of attention
the Japanese have paid to western developments in management
theory and practice is really astonishing. A significant
portion of the literature en management and work in the
Japanese language consists of translations and analysis of
the work of western scholars. The rssearch and proposals of
American organizational specialists are widely known, and
the use of their ideas is common in large Japanese firms
[Ref. 8:p.24].
If any single factor explains Japanese success, it
is the group-directed quest for knowledge. In Japan,
personal development through study is a highly regarded
social activity which continues throughout one's life. By
the time Japanese youth complete formal schooling, they have
13

not only acquired general information, but they have
acquired the habit of studying in groups.
After obtaining employment, the school graduate is
prepared to receive his specialized training and he remains
receptive to broad generalized training. At his work place,
the new employee first undergoes long periods of specific
training as an apprentice and throughout his later career
frequently participates in a variety of study groups. Off
the job, an employee constantly looks for opportunities to
learn what might be useful in his work. But he also tries
to learn many other things which have no apparent immediate
relationship to his work, for they might prove useful in the
long term.
We can get a sense of the Japanese capacity to learn
and adapt western organizational technology to their own
needs through a brief tracing of the introduction of Quality
Control (QC) circles.
QC circles may represent the most innovative process
of borrowing and adaptation in the personnel policies of
large Japanese companies in the postwar period. Before
1945, Japan had only moderate experience with modern methods
of statistical quality control. An early postwar effort was
organized by O.S. occupation officials to enjoin American
statistians to go to Japan and teach American wartime indus-
trial s-andards to Japanese engineers and statisticians.
The Korean War had a further impact on the Japanese
QC movement. In order to win military procurement orders
from the American military during and after the Korean War,
the quality standards defined by the U.S. military had to be
met
.
In 1954, Dr. J. Juran, the noted QC expert, arrived
in Japan for a series of lectures [Ref. 8: p. 25]. He empha-
sized a new orientation to quality control, stating that it
14

should be an integral part of the management function and
practice throughout the firm. In effect, this meant
teaching quality control to middle management.
From 1955 through 1960 these ideas spread rapidly in
major Japanese firms. But there was critical innovation on
the part of the Japanese. In the Japanese reinterpretation,
each and every person in the organization hierarchy, from
top management to rank-and-file employees, received exposure
to statistical quality control knowlege and techniques.
Workers began to participate in study groups to upgrade
quality control practices. These methods gave both a
simple, yet most profound twist to the original ideas propa-
gated by the Western experts.
Quality control shifted from being the prerogative
of a minority of engineers with limited shop experience, to
being the responsibility of each employee. Instead of
adding additional layers of inspectors, reliability
assurance and rework personnel, each worker is expected to
take responsibility for solving quality control problems
when they arise.
The QC circle movsment in Japan has grown explo-
sively. The number of QC circles registered with the Union
of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) increased from
1,000 in 1964 to some 87,000 by 1978. Unregistered QC
circles are conservatively estimatsd to total an additional
five times the number of registered circles. With a total
Japanese labor force of some 37 million in 1978, this means
that approximately one out of every sight Japanese employees
was involved in QC circle activity [Ref. 8:p.26].
QC circles are relatively autonomous units composed
of a small group of workers. Usually there are from 5 to 15
workers per circle with the norm at about 10. Each circle
has a leader which may be a foreman or a senior worker in
15

the group. The role of the leader is to train QC circle
members in problem solving techniques. Elementary statis-
tical techniques, regression analysis, and brainstorming are
just some examples. Once a circle is functioning, the group
leader should play an indirect role and not dominate the
circle.
In principle, it is a study group that concentrates
on solving job-related quality problams. These problems are
broadly conceived as improving methods of production in
support of company-wide efforts. Some typical efforts
include reducing defects, scrap, rework requirements and
production down-time. These activities are in turn expected
to lead to cost-reduction and increased productivity.
In addition to tha above activities, the circles
focus on improving working conditions and the
self-development of workers. This focus includes:
development of the leadership abilities of foremen and
workers, skill development among workers, improvement of
worker morale and motivation, the stimulation of teamwork
within work groups and recognition of worker achievements.
Above all, the circles recognize that hourly workers
have an important contribution to make to the organization
[Hef. 9:p.95].
2. Information-Gather i nq
It is not always clear why knowledge is needed, but
people attempt to store available information on the chance
it may be useful someday.
Japan's elite officials from the various ministries
have the preeminent responsibility for guiding the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. They themselves are constantly analyzing
information and deciding what furthar information needs to
be gathered. [ Bef . 2: p. 36].
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Individual companies sponsor information-gathering
activities with no less enthusiasm than government minis-
tries. On the average, Japanese companies collect and
process information more thoroughly than their foreign
counterparts [Ref. 2: p. 43].
The Japanese general trading companies (like
Mutsubishi, Mitsui Bussan, Sumitomo, Marubeni, Itoh, and
NisshO' Iwai) are unequaled by other companies, Japanese or
foreign, in their international information network. In
part, their success comes simply from their size, since most
of Japan's foreign trade is conducted through these six
companies, each of which is represented in virtually every
country in the world [Ref. 2: p. 44]. But success comes also
because information-gathering has such high priority.
In gathering detailed economic information, private
companies are superior to the Japanese government, but their
superiority is especially pronounced in areas where they
have a substantial economic interest. Even in political
information-gathering they sometimes outdo the Japanese
Foreign Ministry [Ref. 2: p. 44].
The basic long-range effort in gathering information
lies in the continued collection and analysis of non-secret
material relevant to company interest. This information
sometimes extends from macro-economic theory to the price of
hog bristles in rural China [Ref. 2: p. 45].
In large Japanese companies, officials rise slowly
through the ranks. Because employees tend to remain in
large corporations until retirement, it is rational for
Japanese companies to invest far more heavily in training
than do Western companies, where employees with such special
skills would be more attractive to other employers.
Employees on the Management track customarily are
rotated to a wide variety of departments and sent to outside
17

training centers to acquire skills in various areas and to
develop the close personal relationships that will later
facilitate the flow of information needed for effective
management decisions.
Japanese companies that have surpassed their Western
counterparts in their overall level of technology and organ-
izational know-how do not stop learning. They continuously
search out weak spots where another company, Japanese or
foreign, might have more strength. This effort provides
clues as to how they can continue to improve. A small dye
maker in Western Japan with fifty employees, for example,
follows appropriate journals to datermine which interna-
tional dye making plants have made the most important recent
innovations. One or two employees are dispatched each year
to spend a month or more observing these innovations
[Ref. 2: p. 46].
Japanese companies also keep channels open to former
senior executives who are believed to have a priceless accu-
mulation of knowledge and good judgement. By granting
former high officials special honors and privileges, present
officials maintain easy access to their predecessors.
To keep their employees optimally informed, virtu-
ally all sizable companies organize study groups for senior
management, middle management, new employees, and, not
uncommonly, for dependents of employees. The company not
only calls on in-house experts, but invites outside
lecturers on topics of interest. In addition, the company
may set up study groups focusing on new books or articles of
unusual relevance. If a company cannot provide its
employees with appropriate specialized training, the
employees are encouraged to take correspondence courses or
to take a brief leave of absence to attend appropriate
training programs [Hef. 2: p. 49].
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Quantity alone is not the key to Japan* s success in
handling information. Rather, it derives from the long-term
commitment of organizations to their employees and vice-
versa. This permits a level of training and retraining that
is simply not cost effective for organizations with higher
rates of mobility. This continuity in membership means that
information is better retained in the organization, however,
the core of key employees are constantly reprocessing that
information and looking for new opportunities to add broader
understanding.
Information-gathering is not an end in itself. It
is a group-directed process closely linked to long-range
organizational purposes, permitting an impressive range of
information to be concentrated where and when the organiza-
tion can best use it.
B. MANAGEMENT STYLE
1 • Li f st im e Employment , Se niority. System
The most important characteristic of Japanese organ-
ization is permanent employment system. Lifetime employ-
ment, more than being a single policy, is an established
rule under which many aspects of Japanese life and work are
integrated.
Lifetime employment , although desired by workers and
by most employers, is not universal in Japan. Not all firms
can create the stability necessary for lifetime employment.
Thus, about thirty- five percent of Japan's work force is
under lifetime employment in large companies and government
bureaus [Ref. 10: p. 15].
Lifetime employment means that a major firm or
government bureau hires once a year, in the spring, when
young people graduate from high schools and universities. A
19

major firm which hires only "rookies'* takes on a large
inventory of new employees all at once, although it does not
typically have work for all of them immediately. Once
hired, the new employee is retained until mandatory retire-
ment at age fifty-five.
An employee will not be terminated for anything less
than a major criminal offense. Termination is a harsh
punishment, since the one who has bsen fired has no hope of
finding employment in a comparable firm. Instead, the fired
employee must turn either to a minor firm that pays
comparably low wages and offers little security, or must be
ready to run his own business. Upon reaching age
fifty-five, all employees except the top few who are
managing directors of the firm must retire.
There are three factors that explain the reason why
lifetime employment is possible in the Japanese social and
economic structure. First, major Japanese firms pay their
employees a large share of the compensation in the form of
bonuses. The yearly bonus equals five to six months* salary
for each employee. The amount of bonus is not contingent on
individual performance, but only on the performance of the
firm. This compensation method shifts the entrepreneurial
risk of the organization from the stockholders to the
employees, who suffer through bad years and prosper in good
years. 3onuses allow employees to feel they are an impor-
tant part of the firm and motivate them to cooperate in any
way that they can. The lifetime employment system permits a
firm to pay a small amount or no bonus at all if the firm's
performance does not warrant one. Thus a firm can cut its
payroll by perhaps twenty- five percent without laying off
any employee.
The same is true in the case of public employees.
The incentive bonus system for the government employees does
20

not allow those workers to feel as much an important part of
the organization as do most private organizations. But
again, the government has more options to decrease an
employee's salary expenditure without laying off anyone.
Second, every major firm in Japan has a large cate-
gory of temporary employees. These temporary workers are
mostly women. Even today, it is not common that a major
Japanese firm will hire women into professional jobs except
a few labor-intensive industries. Women workers are gener-
ally considered temporary employees and are the first to be
laid off in slack periods . They serve as a "buffer" to
protect the job stability of men workers.
Third, during a recession, small firms that exist
largely due to the success of the major firms may be forced
to go out of business. These firms have little hope of ever
growing into major competitors and exist primarily as
suppliers to the major firms.
The combination of bonus payments, temporary employ-
ment of women workers, and existence of small firms provides
a buffer against uncertainty that lakes stable, lifetime
employment a reality for the male employees of major firms
[Bef. 10: p. 20-22],
The lifetime employment system and the seniority
system are intimately related and appear to be two
expressions of the typical structure of Japanese companies
[Ref. 11: p. 431 ].
Major firms needed to train both a group of highly
skilled laborers and a group of white collar managerial
personnel. Because these skills were not based on experi-
ence with indigenous developments, it took considerable time
and capital investment to train these personnel. As a




This would ensure that the newly trained employees
in whom the company had invested so heavily would be moti-
vated to remain. As the modern industrial sector expanded,
a higher proportion of company employees has gradually been
brought into this seniority and permanent employment
pattern.
2. Long- term Commitment, Slow Evaluation
It usually takes 10 years in the company* s employ
before a newly hired worker receives his first formal evalu-
ation. Until then, no employee will receive a larger
increase in pay nor will he be promoted over more senior
workers. The very slowness of this evaluation process
discourages playing of certain kinds of short-term corporate
games, although it does not entirely rule out such behavior.
An employee, therefore, lacks an incentive to
initiate projects or to press for decisions that may look
good in the short run but may be unacceptable for the long
run. He also has no reason to advance his career at the
expense of someone else because, he knows that he will not
be evaluated for the short run. While this process at times
seems painfully slow to aspiring young managers in Japanese
firms, it surely promotes a very open attitude towards
cooperation, performance, and evaluation, since the system
makes it highly likely that exceptional performance will
indeed be recognized.
The slowness of formal evaluation and promotion
seems wholly unacceptable to most Westerners not only
because Westerners desire rapid feedback and advancement,
but also because the system seems to prevent the early
assignment of the most capable to important jobs.
In Japanese firms, one may notice that formal titles
e.nd actual responsibilities often seem unmatched. The most
22

capable workers easily and quickly receive responsibility,
but promotion comes only when they have mors completely
proven themselves. In addition, major contributors to
success in the past are assured the security of titles and
higher wages despite the threat of young employees. This
fact, observed by everyone, causes employees to be more
willing to wait their turn [Ref. 10: p. 22-24].
3 . Job R otat ion. Job T rain ing
An employee in a Japanese company internalizes the
various values and objectives of xhe firm, becomes increas-
ingly committed to them, and learns the formal and informal
rules and policies. Ths means for obtaining awareness of
the corporation *s mores comes primarily through job rota-
tion. That process usually includes two related types of
job transfers. First, employees are transferred to new
positions to learn additional skills in on-the-job training
programs. These job changes are planned well in advance for
all regular employees, including blue-collar workers.
Second, transfers are part of a long range, experience-
building program through which the organization develops its
future managers. Such programs involve movement across
departmental boundaries at any stage of an employee's
career. While they rotate semilaterally from job to job,
they become increasingly socialized into the organization,
immersed in the company philosophy and culture and bound to
a certain set of mutual goals.
In Japan, we 11- planned job rotation is the key to
the success of an in-company training program that normally
encompasses all the fin's employees. For some categories
of highly skilled blue-collar workers, training plans for a




In the Japanese company, virtually every department
will have in it someone who knows the people, the problems,
and the procedures of any other arsa within the organiza-
tion. When coordination is necessary, both sides will be
able to understand and cooperate with the other. Perhaps
more important, is the fact that every employee knows he
will continue, throughout his career, to move between func-
tions and offices. The person who asks for assistance today
may be one of his co-workers or even his supervisor of
tomorrow. Thus there is incentive for taking a broad organ-
ization-wide point of view. This approach fosters the
reality that total, not simply individual performance, is
the key to organizational and financial success; and that
comes only through company- wide cooperation.
The job rotation is especially important for
managerial personnel. Recent research conducted by M.I.T.
and Columbia University, strongely suggests that workers at
all levels who continually face new jobs will be more vital,
more productive, and mora satisfied with their work than
those who stay in one job, even though the position changes
result only in lateral reassignment [Ref. 10: p. 28].
One of the big differences between the United States
and Japan is the way of dealing with the problem of indus-
trialization. In the United States, companies specialize
their jcbs and individuals specialize their careers. As a
result, a semiconductor specialist, a portfolio manager, or
a personnel manager can bs moved from Company A to Company B
and within a week, can be working effectively. Full produc-
tivity takes longer, but contributions begin right away. In
Japan, however, it is difficult to take a worker from one
company, move him to anoths r company, and expect him immedi-
ately "to be fully productive. Japanese do not specialize
only in a technical field; they also specialize in an
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organization, in learning how to make a specific, unique
business operate as well as it possibly can.
One effect of life-long job rotation is employer
incentives to develop both the skills and the commitment of
their employees. In the Qnited States employers are reluc-
tant to invest in training employees in new technical
skills, because a skilled employee can easily find another
employer who is willing to pay a higher wage [Ref. 10:
p.29].
4 . Concern for t he Employee
In a Japanese firm, an employee forms inclusive
relationships with his employer, whereas most Western organ-
izations practice an attitude of "partial inclusion." This
represents an understanding between employee and employer
that the connection between them involves only those activi-
ties directly connected with the completion of an assigned
job. Being partially included in a number of organizations
facilitates moving from one social domain to another, and
allows tensions that have built up in one setting to be
relaesed in another [Hef. 10: p. 44],
When people anticipate a lifetime of working
together, they cannot afford to let deep rifts develop.
Conflict and refusal would disturb the harmony that must
underlie the work relationship. No company can remain




The wholistic orientation of Japanese organizations
stems from both historical accident and underlying social
and cultural forces. According to one commonly-held view,
the historical accident is that industrialism rushed into
Japan after having been held out for decades by a feudal
political system. Companies were forced to build plants
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close to the villages in order to easily recruit workers.
With no long and gradual urbanization as Europe had, Japan
found itself with a sparsely-distributed rural population
faced with the onrush of industrialization. Each plant sent
recruiters to village homes asking parents to send their
offspring to work in the plant twenty or thirty miles away.
Village parents would simply not release them to go -co live
and work in a strange place. The company's logical response
was to build dormitories, to provide a healthy diet, and to
assure parents that their children would receive the moral,
intellectual, physical, and domestic training that would
prepare them for life. In the case of young women, the
company arranged for training in domestic skills needed by a
young wife. No partial inclusion, no tentative relationship
between company and employee was possible in this setting
[Ref. 10: p. 45-46].
In the Japanese company, it is an established prac-
tice for managers to spend a lot of time talking to
employees about everyday matters. Thus they develop a
feeling for employees* personal needs and problems as well
as for their performance. Obviously, gaining this intimate
knowledge of each employee is easier when an employee has a
long tenure, but managers consciously attempt to get to know
their employees, and they place a premuim on providing time
to talk. The quality of relationships developed with subor-
dinates is also an important factor on which a manager is
evaluated.
Various company-sponsored cultural, athletic, and
other recreational activities further deepen involvement in
employees* lives. [Ref. 12: p. 17-18].
In Japan, a company allocates substantial fiancial
resources to pay for benefits for all employees, such as a
family allowance and various commuting and housing
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allowances. In addition, many Japanese firms provide a
whole range of welfare services from subsidized company
housing for families and dormitories for unmarried
employees, through company nurseries and company
scholarships for employees* children, to mortgage loans,
credit facilities, savings plans, and insurance. Thus the
employees often perceive a close rslationship between his
own welfare and the company's financial welfare.
5 . Enter prise Unionism
Most traditional Japanese firms have what foreign
people would define as "company unions" that are decidedly
pro-management. The contract between union and management
is more an understanding than a legal document. Permanent
employees are protected primarily by social obligations that
bind those in control. For example, management is committed
for "life" and cannot dispose of the company as negotiable
property when business gets bad. In fact, it is customary
that executives take a pay cut before other employees are
affected. Surplus workers may be loaned to other firms in
the family for up to several years, but their seniority
status and other rights which accrue with the parent firm
must not be abandoned. Annual bonuses may be pared down or
skipped under extremely bad circumstances, but retroactive
compensation is usually given when conditions permit.
In return, both the union and individual workers of
Japanese firms are expected to look out for the interests of
the firm on their own initiative. They are expected to view
the company's survival and well-being in the same light as
their own. One example of the unity of effort is for each
worker to put in overtime whenever asked. This is accom-
plished without claiming premium pay and despite any incon-
venience which may arise. The traditional Japanese approach
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might more appropriately be thought of as "familism"
[Ref. 13: p. 79],
Recently, a number of major Japanese companies began
pushing upward the age for compulsory retirement to 60 years
of age. [Ref. 14, p. 15]. Many industrial unions have also
indicated a willingness to take a flexible position in
labor-management negotiations on wages, retirement
allowances, employment, promotions, and other guestions to
ensure that the compulsory retirement age is extended to 60.
6 • Dec ision- ma king
Few Japanese management practices are so misunder-
stood by outsiders as is the decision-making process. The
image is guite entrenched in Western literature on Japanese
organizations. Scores of managers huddle together in
endless discussion until consensus on every detail is
reached, after which a symbolic document, "ringi," is passed
around so they can affix their seals of approval on it.
This image negates the considerable degree of decentraliza-
tion for most types of decisions that is characteristic in
most subsidiaries. In fact, when time is short, decisions
are routinely made by the manager in charge.
Under the usual procedure for top management deci-
sion-making, a proposal is initiated by a middle manager
(but often under the directive of top management) . This
middle manager engages in informal discussion and consulta-
tion with peers and supervisors. When all are familiar with
the proposal, a formal request for a decision is made and,
because of earlier discussions, is almost always approved -
often in a ceremonial group meeting or through the "ringi"




This kind of decision-making is not participative in
the Western sense of the word, which encompasses negotiation
and bargaining between a manager and subordinates. In the
Japanese context, negotiations are primarily lateral between
the departments concerned with the decision. Within the
work group, the emphasis is on including all group menbers
in the process of decision-making, not on achieving
consensus on the alternatives. Opposing parties are willing
to go along with the comfort that their viewpoint may carry
the day the next time around.
Japanese managers, instead of examining every aspect
and contingency of proposed alternatives, prefer to obtain a
relatively general agreement on the direction to follow,
leaving the details to be solved as their resolution becomes
mandatory. Accordingly, the refinement of a proposal occurs
during its early implementation stage.
Consultation with lower-ranking employees in
Japanese firms does not au tomatically imply that the deci-
sion process is "bottom up," as suggested by several
research papers on Japanese management. Especially in the
case of long-term planning and strategy, the initiative
comes mostly from the top. Furthermore, consultative deci-
sion-making does not diminish top- managements responsi-
bility for a decision's consequences [Ref. 12: p. 16-17].
The Japanese manager sees his task as improving on
the initiatives of others and creating an atmosphere in
which subordinates are motivated to seek better solutions.
He also encourages a flow of initiative and information from
the lower levels to the top of the organization. Senior
managers of Japanese firms play a key role in shaping deci-
sions. When a subordinate brings in a proposal, the manager
does not simply accept or reject it. Instead, he tactfully
asks questions, makes suggestions, provides encouragement.
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and, if necessary, sends the person back for more answers.
This sequence may recur, and if it does, the proposal gener-
ally improves each time. If the two ultimately decide that
the proposal has merit, the manager refers it to others
higher in the organization. He is, in a word, a
facilitator.
In the Japanese system, junior managers are not
functional specialists who carry oat their boss's direc-
tives. Rather, they are both initiators who perceive prob-
lems, and coordinators who, in liaison with others in other
functional areas, help shape a composite plan before
presenting it to their superiors.
A typical Japanese middle-manager knows almost
everybody in related areas of the hierarchy, so he may
easily obtain required information. When he makes a certain
recommendation, all coordination is usually done in advance.
This process takes time. A big decision may take half a
year, perhaps more. In addition, he spends much of his *ime
talking on the phone. But when he presents his porposal to
the senior manager, all the functional areas are on board,
and implementation is immediate once the decision to move is
made.
In general, Japanese place much more emphasis than
do Westerners on coordination skills. Japanese managers
expect their subordinates to communicate with other func-
tional areas. As a result, most employees of the Japanese
firms are well aware, not only of the issues facing the
organization, but also others problems and perspectives
[Ref. 15: p. 62-66].
Another key feature of decision-making in Japan is
the intentional ambiguity of who is responsible for what
decisions. The evidence indicates that no one individual
carries total responsibility for a particular task. Rather,
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a group or team of employees assumes joint responsibility
for a set of tasks. This approach often allows things to
"fall through the cracks" because everyone thinks another
person has taken the problem to tackle. When working well,
however, this approach leads to a naturally participative
decision-making and problem solving process.
In a Japanese company, if one employee becomes ill
or has some other problem that seriously impedes his ability
to function at work, the other members of his work group are
obliged to take up his share of the load. When the employee
returns to work, he can step right back in and do his share.
The group's working relationship is one of the
reasons for the job rotation. As with all other character-
istics of the Japanese management system, the decision-
making process results from a complex system of parts that
are joined together. This system relies upon trust and





Korea has a short history of business operations.
During this period, Korean entrepreneurs, together with the
strong support of the government, have achieved stupendous
economic growth. There are several observers who regarded
Korea as "a second Japan." It is true that Korean
management patterns were influenced by Japanese practices in
some respects. However, the Korean management style in the
present days is different from that of the Japanese. In
this chapter, the cultural background and the
characteristics of the Korean management will be studied in
detail.
A. PRIVATE ENTREPRENEORSHIP
The emergence of a thriving entrepreneurial class in
Korea is particularly intriguing, since it runs counter to
the traditional value system. Confucianism places commerce
and industry at the bottom of the Korean "Sa, Nong, Kong,
Sang" (scholar-official, farmer, artisan, merchant) status
hierarchy. The traditional idea of Korean Confucianism did
not have much respect for technical and physical or manual
labor but rather despised this. Laboring for material
production could not have the qualities of being a
gentleman. Labor was the job only for a workman.
Therefore, industrial techniques could never be developed.
Trade and commerce, without being esteemed, even nominally,
had been regarded as the meanest sort of work.
It was after the end of World War II that ordinary
Korean people began to think that getting rich might be much
more important than being a man of virtue. Accordingly,
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little cr no prior history of entrepreneurship had existed
in Korea. Under the Ti dynasty (a Korean kingdom;
1392-1910), there was no industrial entrepreneurship and
only a very weak mercantile class. It was "traditional" to
rely on small-scale, labor-intensive "handicraft" production
techniques. The economy for the general public was charac-
terized by household production and limited exchange.
Under the Japanese colonialist (1910-1945), modern
economic activity was overwhelmingly dominated by the
Japanese; and such limited indigenous entrepreneurs as
emerged under the Japanese lost their physical capital, if
not their lives, during the chaos of the Korean War. During
the Japanese colonial era, the future bureaucrats, entre-
preneurs, and managers of Korea had a chance to make them-
selves familiar with the Japanese practices and experiences
by "watching" rather than by "doing." When the Japanese
left Korea suddenly, with the declaration of an uncondi-
tional surrender in 1945, the Republic of Korea inherited
about 2,500 operating industrial and business enterprises
[Ref. 16: p. 30], The physical facilities the Japanese left
behind were dissipated and contributed remarkably litttle to
independent industrial growth.
During the period of U.S. Military Government (September
1945 to August 1948), industrial output dropped dramati-
cally. Industrial output for 1948 was estimated at only 14
percent of the 1938 level [Ref. 16: p. 31]- How was it that
more than two years after the Japanese withdrawal, only 20
percent of vested industry was in operation? The absence of
trained manpower was the most important factor for the
limited operation.
The new government was established under the leadership
of President Rhee. The political chaos and market disrup-
tion together with the tragedy of the Korean War prevented
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the new government from improving the situation. During the
unstable period of the late 19U0*s and early 1950's, some of
the so-called "vested property," which was controlled first
by the U.S. Military Government and then by the new Korean
government, was transferred to several active Koreans, who
were generally either forier employees or shareholders of
the firms. The OB Beer Company was taken over by a Korean
minority shareholder in the parent Japanese Kirin Company.
He is the founder of today 1 s Doosan Sroup. A technician in a
Japanese textile firm became acting manager under the
Americans, later bought the plant, and built it into the
Sunkyung Group. A similiar sequence was followed by the
only Korean employee of a Japanese explosives firm, and it
grew into today's Korea Explosive Group [Ref. 16],
The successful cases presented above applied to only a
small portion of the vested property. A few of the largest
enterprises taken over from the Japanese were turned over
for management to the Korean government departments.
Examples are electricity, railroads, communications,
tobacco, and coal mining.
Before the 1940' s there were only a few Korean entre-
preneurs in a modern sense. Wealthy men at that time were
mostly landlords, local brewery owners, or mill owners.
Most of the present day Korean business groups appeared
during the 30 years after the end of World War II.
During the same period, there was not much new capital
for investment. Therefore, these newly appeared
entrepreneurs and their wealth accumulation must indicate
the redistribution of existing national wealth and/or
foreign wealth transferred through aid rather than new
wealth accumulated from their productive activities.
Japanese properties and aid dollars were distributed at
very low prices. Even these acquisitions were made with
34

cheap bank loans under the existing hyper-inflationary situ-
ation. And cheap bank loans were mostly concentrated on a
few •chaebol' (family-based industrial conglomerates)
.
Hyper-inflation, shortage of supply and high import tariff
protected chaebol's monopoly prices. The domestic tax struc-
ture was also favorable for chaebol. As their production
began, import of foreign products was restricted on the
excuse of protecting domestic industries and at the same
time, various tax privileges were also provided. Most
chaebol in Korea, accordingly, were able to appear in a
short period of time with the help of the government privi-
leges provided.
The situation, however, has been changed dramatically
since the beginning of the President Park's era. After the
Military Revolution (May 16, 1961), a five-year economic
development plan was launched in 1962. Under the clear
guidance and strong support of the newly established
Economic Planning Board (EP B) , the private entrepreneurship
was awaken from long hibernation and energized for economic
achievement in the 1970* s.
According to the results of the entrepreneurship survey
performed by the Korea Development Institution (KDI) in
1976, the top-ranking answer for the first self-perception
question on the characteristics that distinguish successful
entrepreneurs from their less successful brethren was "hard
work." There is no doubt that Koreans work long hours by
international standards. The average weekly working hours
for Korean entrepreneurs is 54, their senior staff 53, and
their ordinary employees 5 2 hours [Ref. 16: p. 247]. The
long hours of entrpreneurs not only distinguish successful
from unsuccessful entrepreneurs but are characteristic of
the entire economic system . As one example, the regular
wonking hours of the senior staff of the most rapidly
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growing chaebol, Daewoo, are from 8:00 in the morning to
7:00 in the evening. To staff its thirty-six foreign
branches, necessary language training is provided from 6:00
to 8:00 a.m. daily, with any absences "affecting promotion"
[Ref. 16: p. 247].
Let us next turn our attention toward the problem of
economic concentration. While most Western economies are
preoccupied with the effects of industrial concentration,
the share of a given number of enterprises in a particular
market, the problem of business concentration, the share of
a given number of affiliated enterprises in all markets, has
attracted particular attention in Asia, for example, the
Japanese zaibatsu (a Japanese system of highly centralized
family control, through holding companies), India's indus-
trial houses, and the Korean chaebol.
At the center of each Korean chaebol is the "chairman"
who is the dynamic and cohesive force of the group.
Typically, he is an entrepreneur in the truest sense of the
word, who founds one enterprise and then holds the position
of the president or leaves its management to a relative, or
more recently, to a trusted associate as he moves on to a
new venture. Majority shares in the various enterprises are
held by the chairman and his immediate relatives. In some
chaebol, professional managers play a rapidly increasing
role. Guidance and direction, however, remain highly
centralized in the chairman. Unlike the Japanese zaibatsu,
which are centered on their own banks and other financial
institutions, the Korean chaebol rely on government
controlled credit institutions. As a result, the Korean
chaebol exercise distinctly less economic power than their
Japanese counterparts do. Economic power is related to the
size of the chaebol relative to the rest of the economy.
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In the next few pages, the evolution of five of Korea's
leading chaebol will be presented. The goal is not in-depth
critical analysis but a flushing out of the dimensions of
Korean growth by decomposition into individual entrepreneurs
and companies. The group presented have been selected to
illustrate the diversity that characterizes Korean entrepre-
neurial success. Four groups that started before or during
the Korean War and prospered during the next three decades
will be considered first: Samsung, which produces largely
consumer goods; Hyundai, which concentrates on producers'
goods; Lucky, which has been run by the second generation
even more successfully; and Hanjin, which deals in the
transportation sector. Finally, Das woo, will be reviewed.
Daewoo is one of the "new generation" groups which was
founded in the late 1960's, and has since enjoyed phenomenal
success.
1 . Sa msung : Consumer 3 oods Producer
B. C. Lee, Samsung's chairman, is widely regarded as
the richest man in Korea. His entrepreneurial activities
began in 1936. Under the Japanese colonial rule, he ran his
local milling business quite well and became one of the
largest taxpayers in the province. He established Samsung
Company in 1948. The group exports six percent of the total
export of Korea and pays 3. 5 percent of all the taxes in the
country. Total sales reached over $3.4 billion in 1979
[Ref. 19]- The group consists of about twenty industrial
companies which engage in foreign trade, and include sugar,
woolen textile, department store, hotel, insurance, news-
paper, television, paper, hospital, and electronic
companies.
Samsung's management technique is considered the
best in the country. An advanced guidance and control
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system plus a great deal of freedom have been provided for
the company chiefs within the group. One result of this is
that other groups steal employees from Samsung, while
Samsung in its turn is not anxious to employ people from
other companies. It prefers to train its own young
employees from scratch, and to produce the so-called
"Samsung spirit" [Ref. 5: p. 120]. The majority of 230
executives in the group are "original Samsung men"
[Ref. 18]. B. C. Lee is a graduate of a Japanese University
and known to have excellent connections with large Japanese
elite companies. The group has technological cooperation
agreements with Nippon Electric, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and the
shipbuilding gaint IHI [Ref. 16: p.3U9-354]. The Samsung
is, therefore, known as the most Japanese-influenced busi-
ness group in Korea.
2. Hyundai; Aggressive Entrepreneur ship in Producer's
Goods
Hyundai's evolution has been markedly different from
that of Samsung. In the first place, Samsung concentrated
on consumer goods, while Hyundai, the largest and the most
aggressive business group in Korea, has focused on producer
goods such as construction, shipbuilding, machinery, cement,
engineering, and one consumer durable, the automobile.
Secondly, and more important, Hyundai has been the
leader in the 1970's effort to move the Korean economy into
industrailization. The uncertainty of success in this
effort has meant that Hyundai has taken far more risks and
has had to be far more innovative. Witness its constrution
of a world-class shipyard, efforts to export automobiles,
and successful competition with established American and
European giants for Middle Eastern construction markets.
Hyundai also is viewed much more sympathetically by the
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Korean government than any other chaebol, since development
of heavy industry has been a long-run government objective.
Risky endeavors reguire implicit government contingency
insurance.
The chairman and founder, of the Hyundai group is
C.I. Chung. He established Hyundai Construction Company,
his first company and also the cornerstone of his business
group in 1947, and took full advantage of reconstruction
reguirements after the Korean War. A striking feature of
Hyundai's growth has been its expansion into international
construction markets in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Middle
East.
Five huge Olsan drydocks of Chung 1 s Hyundai
Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Company are capable of
building the eguivalent of eight supertankers annually. A
260,000 ton tanker was constructed and delivered in 1974 as
its first contract with a 3 reek shipowner.
Hyundai group had $4.3 billion in sales in 1979
[Ref. 19]. The group 1 s 330 exectutives are composed of
Chung's relatives, original employees of the group, and
others who were invited from the other groups, foreign coun-
tries or retired government officials [Ref. 18].
3. Luck2: A Su ccessfu l Shift in Ge neration
This group contains some 15 companies, which consist
of foreign trade, electronics, oil refinery, and chemical
companies. Lucky group was founded in 1947 by I. H. Koo.
His eldest son assumed top management responsibility in
1969. After the nine years of operation by C. K. Koo, his
eldest son, the group's sales have ballooned ten times, to
$2.2 billion in 1978. Lucky manufactured 55 percent of all
refrigerators in Korea (annual production of these was
250,000), 45 percent of all television sets, 65 percent of
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all elevators and 70 percent of all airconditioning equip-
ment in 1978 [Ref. 17: p. 57 J.
** • Han~jin: Succe ss in the Service Sector
Hanji^s initial accumulation was obtained by its
contract with U.S. military units during and after the
Korean War, and Vietnam contracts provided further impetus
to its growth. It differs sharply from the other chaebol
considered thus far, in that activities are largely confined
to transportation and accompanying services.
With the nations liberation in 1945, C. H. Cho, the
founder, opened the Hanjin Transporation Co. with one truck.
His company grew quite fast, and by the outbreak of the
Korean War he owned a fleet of about 30 trucks and 20 small
ships. The war took all his property, and afterwards he had
to start all over again. He managed to get service
contracts for transporting military supplies and became a
supply agent for the U.S. Army in Korea. He established his
creditability with the a. S. Army authorities, and this
became critical for his future involvement in Vietnam. The
dollars earned in Vietnam allowed further expansion of his
domestic ventures. He bought the governments deficit-
ridden Korean Air Lines in 1969 despite advice to the
contrary from some of his major staffs. In the end, the
venture proved quite profitable, and the purchase price was
paid off in five years instead of the contracted ten.
Affiliated companies of the group include overland
transportation, airlines, shipping, construction, sight-




5. Daewoo: A "New Gene rati on" Chaebol
In 1975 Daewoo became the seventh largest chaebol in
Korea in terms of annual sales. It is of particular
interest for two reasons. First, it is in all probability
Korean fastest growing chaebol of the 1970 's. Second, and
of more importance, it is one of the "new generation" of
business groups. Unlike the entreprenuers discussed previ-
ously, Daewoo's founder, U. J. Kim, grew up in an indepen-
dent Korea and did not get a start in business until the
late 1960* s. The group 1 s initial success came in the export-
trade but soon expanded into export production and, in the
mid- 1 970' s diversified into a variety of areas including
foreign trade, construction, electronics, shipbuilding, and
heavy machinery.
In 1967 0. J. Kim established Daewoo Industrial
Company at the age of 31. He initially dealt with foreign
buyers he knew from his previous job, but rapidly expanded
his contacts. The company's growth was impressive. Over
the nine-year period, 19 67-1976, Daewoo grew at a 122
percent annual average rate. The group's sales reached $2
billion in 1978. The success is in part attributed to a
policy of paying employees extremely high wages but
demanding commensurately long hours. In fifteen years after
the foundation, the Group has grown from a miniscule base to
23 companies with 36 foreign branches and 58,000 employees
[Ref. 16: p. 361-364].
B. CULTURAL BACKGROUND
To understand the management style of a people, it is
essential to take a look at their national character,
cultural heritage and traditional ideals. Korea's long
historical continuity as a nation has produced a unique
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social and cultural heritage. Notwithstanding the influence
of powerful neighbors, Koreans have managed to retain a
strong national and racial identity. It is their culture,
inspired and perpetuated under the most trying
circumstances, of which the Korean people ara justifiably
proud, other than mere longevity. For centuries, Koreans
practiced a philosophy and a code of ethics which was so
general in its diffusion as to constitute the mores of the
people. Korea's cultutre was especially influenced by
China, But much of Korea and many things Korean, have
remained virtually unchanged throughout the centuries.
It is worthwhile to discuss Confuciansim which has
played a central role in forming Koreans' behavioral
patterns. Confucianism began about 500 B.C., but did not
become dominant in Korea Until the birth of Yi Dynasty
(1392-1910). Buddism, blamed as an influence for the ills
in the previous dynasty, was cast out and the Confucian
doctrine was established as the ethical principle of the
state.
Confucius (550-478 B.C.), a scholar and a statesman,
taught his disciples that society was a series of social
relationships consisting of fivefold loyalties; ruler and
subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and
younger, and friends. This is a belief formulated to promote
the organization of the family unit and reverence of elders.
The cardinal virtue of filial pisty was combination of
loyalty and reverence.
He taught that, in order to gain a well-ordered society,
five virtues must be applied to interpersonal relationships:
love of humanity, consideration for another's feelings and
emotions, justice, reverence, acknowledging another's
rights, sincerity and truthfulness of purpose. He also
taught that man is good by nature. His moral rules of
42

conduct, man to man, are little short of Christian ideals.
However, the basic attitude is one of justice and loyalty
rather than of love.
Also, in Confucianism, great emphasis is placed on
proper behavior between inferior and superior, in other
words, vertical human relations instead of the principle of
equality. This discriminating priciple of human relations
derived from Confucianism became an integral part of Korean
customs and manners and it has caused much discord between
superior and inferior; the rich and the poor, man and woman,
senior and junior, elder and younger, and in many cases,
between friends [Ref. 21: p. 55-56].
Confuciansim, at any rate, became the ethics and culture
of the learned and official classes of the Korean society,
thus creating a strong national practice in Korea through
the centuries.
Another influence inherited form Confucianism is
fatalism, a predominating factor in the attitude of the
people, and a facet of philosophy suitable to the agrarian
and bureaucratic character of their kingdom. The other
aspect of undesirable influence from Confucianism is a
contempt for manual labor. Confucianism has encouraged
ambitious young men to become scholars or bureaucrats. As a
result, people looked down upon workmen or merchants.
Consequently, the development of commerce and industry in
Korea was delayed.
Confuciansim, which is based on rational ethics, is a
philosophy rather than a religon. There is no strong sense
of worship of a divine power, but rather a code of morals
which was respondsible for shaping Korean life for more than
five hundred years, and still constitutes the basic moral
law of Korea. Since the beginning of the twentieth century,
the influence of Confucianism has declined with the spread
of Christianity in Korea.
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After the annexation of Korea by the Japanese (1910),
there was an attempt to enforce the Japanese religion but
that did not gain popularity in Korea. With the strong
influence of American culture introduced during and after
the Korean War, Confucianism has been weakened in some
respect. However, the principle of Confuciansim still domi-
nates Koreans* behavioral patterns.
As much as Korean society has changed during the twen-
tieth century, it has remained deeply rooted in the tradi-
tions of the past. These tradtional patterns have found
their most fundamental expression in the relations of
kinship, which have continued to shape the dynamics of
social interaction in the 1970*s. Loyalties to kins have
always superseded loyalties to friends, neighbors, or the
state and are likely to continue doing so.
Since 1894, when the legal basis for class distinctions
was dissolved, the traditional systme of social stratifica-
tion and its attendant bonds, privileges, obligations, and
values have undergone a process of change that has fundamen-
tally altered many aspects of Korean society. Numerous
aspects of traditional social structure have nonetheless
continued to exert a crucial influence on present-day values
and institutions, particularly with regard to the primacy of
kin ties [Ref. 22: p. 78].
The next discussion will be on the traditional community
institutions. The most important social units in Korea were
clearly those based on kinship. The household and clan were
the basis of living arrangements, mutual self-help, much of
the education of the young, definitions of the individuals
place in society, and most of his social contact. The other
important unit in society was the community. Its members
cooperated in their agricultural tasks and gave mutual
assistance in times of crisis, operated as political units,
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and formed the basis of almost all social contacts other
than those resulting from kinship ties.
C. FOREIGN INFLUENCE: JAPAN AND U.S.
At the end of the nineteenth century Western influences
began to penetrate Korean society, effecting changes in the
social stratification and traditional values. The colonial
domination of the Japanese that followed seriously disrupted
landholding patterns and their concomitant social institu-
tions, and continued the introduction of Western ideas and
values. The process of change accelerated after World War
II, first under the influence of the Korean War and later as
the process of urbanization and industrialization altered
the rural and agrarian character of Korean cities.
The first reform of Korean society in 1894 was largely
forced by Japan. The most important was the abolition of
legal distinction in social class and the freeing of the
slaves. These changes began to soften the rigidity of
social stratification. But the economic superiority of
former "yangban" (the traditional ruling class) remained in
force, so that they still enjoyed high status implicitly.
Boveover, the centuries-old habits of social behavior
could not be legislated out of existence at a stroke.
Former yangban thought of themselves as adhering to a higher
code of ethical behavior than common folk and retained a
strong aversion to physical labor. To a certain extent,
mostly in rural areas and among older people, these atti-
tudes persisted into present time, well after the economic
differences between yangban and commoners had been reduced.
Westernizing forces also began to modify family tradi-
tions. The introduction of Christianity and the influence
of Christian missionaries are thought to have had a particu-
larly strong impact. Westernization under the Japanese
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brought about other changes. The concept of private owner-
ship of property, that had previously been reserved to the
family as a whole, was permitted.
Five years after the withdrawal of the Japanese, the
Korean War broke out. Although the war lasted a relatively
short period of time, it brought almost all young Korean men
into the armed forces. They were exposed to a way of life
most had never seen before, to the possibilities of urban
life and modern technology, and to the values that accompa-
nied them.
The economic boom of the 1960*s and 1970's permitted the
creation of a substantial and growing middle class. A
substantial proportion of the middle class achieved their
positions through self- employment and small scale
ent repreneurship that they were able to parley into
successful businesses and industrial enterprises. In a
society where people are under tremendous pressure to make a
success in life, where competition is always keen and often
unfair, the patterns of thought and action are at times
somewhat unusual.
Confucianism, lack of stability, and over-crowding are
the factors which have determined Korean behavioral
patterns. These factors have developed a lack of public
morality and concern for those outside one's own family and
clan. There was little confidence in institutions or the
government. Loyalties are directed mainly toward the family
or an individual leader.
Korea today shows many faces. The old ways of thinking
remain strong in the minds of most people, regardless of
their education and rank. Christianity has introduced a new
appreciation of the value of the individual, especially of
women. Even among Christian groups, however, there is a gap
between Christian dogma and Christian ethics [ Ref . 20:
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p. 134]. Many Korean Christians are in reality more
Confucian than Christian in their attitudes and behavior.
Koreans live in a moral climate that is so different
from that in Western countries that it appears amoral to
some foreigners. The ethics practiced are a modification of
Confucianism. Some of the Koreans who have received the
most advanced education in Western countries have dual
personalities. With a foreigner they can appear to be
almost completely Western in their attitudes, language, and
manners. However, once they are with an all-Korean group,
they revert to their Korean personality, and can express all
the traditional attitudes and prejudices, and assume "face,"
with the most nationalistic of their fellows. People who
thus live in two worlds tend, when under pressure, to revert
to their former state. When things are going well, the
person will seem to hold to his newly-acquired western atti-
tudes and standards. As things become more difficult, he
may switch to traditional Korean attitudes.
The traditions of Korea, in any event, have been
strongly influenced and modified by the increasing number of
Koreans who have received part or all of their advanced
training in Western countries, by the impact of
Christianity, and by increasing contacts between this once-
hermit nation and foreigners, both in Korea and in the world
at large.
D. MANAGEMENT STYLE
While the modernization of Japan was initiated with the
Meiji Restoration in 1868, and its private enterprise has
over a 100^year history of profit-pursuit, Korea has only a
little over 35 years of tradition in private enterprise in
modern terms. Although it may be somewhat hasty to discuss
the style of Korean management with a tradition of little
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more than one generation, it will be worthwhile to take at
least a cursory view of its style, because the Korean busi-
ness firms have been forming their own management style.
One of the two conflicting principles of the Korean
society is a vertical human relationship between senior and
junior that is deeply rooted in the thoughts of Koreans.
This is particularly important to the aged people with
origins from Confucian traditions. The other is the prin-
ciple of equality that was introduced by Western- oriented
Judeo-Christian beliefs and is strongly supported by the
younger generations. Accordingly, the importance of main-
taining good human relationships is broadly emphasized in
most Korean organizations.
During the years from the beginning to the middle of the
twentieth century, the advanced countries (the Western coun-
tries and Japan) made every effort to achieve the develop-
ment of the scientific technique for consolidating the
foundation of modern civilization and for promoting national
prosperity. In the meantime the Korean society has suffered
severely from political instabilities and the transition
from the old concept of traditional values to a newly-
formed, modernized consciousness.
There are three factors that led the Korean society to
confusion and instability in the 1950 *s. The primary factor
was the thorough exploitation by Japanese colonialism for
some 40 years before the end of World War II. The second
factor was the Korean War. It broke out five years after
the liberation from Japanese colonialism and destroyed most
of the industrial facilities and properties that had been
the basis of hope for the future of Korea. The final factor
was the ineptitude of governmental leadership which
controlled Korea until the early 1960's. The political
stability which is essential to economic development was
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finally solidified under the new leaders, most of whom were
from the military. Social frictions and confrontations
among the Korean people have arisen largely because of three
conflicting factors. Those factors are the traditional
thought of Confucianism, egalit arianism espoused by
Christianity, and the political instability that had
continued since the end of the nineteenth century.
The old Koreans were reluctant to recognize the break-
down of traditional behavior among the young because of the
frustration they felt at seeing revolutionary changes in the
traditional value system. The younger generation, on the
other hand, felt it was no longer necessary to show respect
to their seniors, and they began refusing to recognize the
seniors 1 authority, a concept which had been a cultural
imperative of the Korean society for centuries. Such
discord has been gradually reduced of late, and the Korean
society has become more stable. The newly educated genera-
tions have begun to take over the middle and top management
positions in various areas of Korean society since the
beginning of the 1970 *s.
Since these social instabilities had continued for such
a long period of time, there was no substantial reduction in
the nation's poverty level. In addition, these conditions
severly limited the chances for nation-wide accumulation of
capital and for the establishment of universally practiced
management techniques. The continuity provided by the
stabilization of the national scene for the last two decades
seems to have been the catalyst for forming Korea's own
business tradtition and management style.
A managerial atmosphere analyzed in a somewhat superfi-
cial view, tells us that Confucianism-oriented human rela-
tionships have been formed in the Korean firms. Also the
Japanese management style, in which most Koreans were not
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allowed to participate, has greatly influenced the
managerial practices of the Korean firms. Finally, both the
modern management techniques practiced by the employees
through their military experiences, and the Western
management introduced by the intellectuals who returned home
from studying abroad (largely in the United States), have
contributed in forming the unique style of management
practiced in Korea today.
It is, in a word, a managerial atmosphere that is prop-
erly harmonized by the full idea of Confucianism inside and
the Western rationalism outside. As time passes, its final
form is likely to be very similiar to the Japanese manage-
ment style. The reasons for the above prospect are the
geographical proximity of the two countries, the Korean's
sense of intimacy with the Japanese way of thought and the
way of behavior due to the similiar influences from
Confucian tradition. This prospect may also be true because
of the Korean businessmen's admiration of Japanese
techniques. Those techniques are believed to be one of the
key factors in the Japanese outstanding economic success.
In addition, the two hardships of having poor resources and
heavy population pressure are characteristics common to each
of the two countries and may result in similar prescriptions
for dealing with these problems.
Since full-scale business operations began, Korean
society has become less stable. This change has resulted
from impatience with the "perceived" slow national growth,
and has created the desire to gain sadden wealth among indi-
viduals. Furthermore, the unfamiliar conditions of competi-
tion resulted in a perceived decline in business morality.
In Korea, the exectutives of the big business group have
been composed of the relatives of the owner, employees who
joined the business group in its pioneer days through an
50

open examination, and former high-ranking officials of the
government, banks, or the other companies. Although there
is no fixed pattern for the selection of management, the
number of the executives who joined the company through open
examination and who have worked for the company for a long
period of time was increased recently. This indicates that
the abilities of the executives, hired because of their
performance on open examinations, have received gradual
recognition and that lifetime employment trends began to be
accepted in the business society.
However, a large number of employees of primarily
medium-sized firms still change positions frequently. The
average Korean male worker is reported to work about 3.4
years at one company (Ref. 23]. This is often due to
economic stagnation that occurs periadically and lack of job
security in small and medium-sized enterprises.
Another reason for this short-term service average is
that many people who want to be hired simply accept a job
without much consideration of their vocational aptitude and
salary level, because of a paucity of available positions.
Two adverse characteristics of Korean private enter-
prises in terms of their employment policies are their
heavily-weighted view of education and the cordial treatment
extended to the administrative managers. Japanese college
graduates are paid 1.2 times the amount that high school
graduates receive for their work. On the other hand, Korean
college graduates get over two times that of tha high school
graduates for their starting salary. This wage differential
leads the less educated employees to feel severely inferior.
The wages of technical professionals are 1.86 times the
average wage of all Korean workers, and the average wage for
administrative managers is 2.99 timss the average for all
Korean workers [ Ref . 24].
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The other negative effects of big wage differences among
employees who have varied occupations and educational back-
grounds are a lack of membership consciousness, avoidance of
responsibilities, loss of the creative will for work, and
insincere quality control. This results in pressure to
obtain a higher level of education. It also results in
aimless efforts to obtain a college education by
ill-prepared and ill-motivated students and creates an
enormous waste of effort, time, and funds. Product quality
deterioration without reductions in product price is
believed to have been increased because of the habitual
practice of unproductive discrimination.
Although the general wage level in Korea has been
substantially increased since the 1970' s, it has never
exceeded an average of one third of those wages received by
Western workers. Because of the shortage of the absolute
income of middle-class workers in the Korean society and the
establishment of a price structure at international levels,
there has been long-standing poverty among the low-income
wage earners. The habit of frugality became a part of
Korean life, since the only way to solve the problem of
shortage of living allowances is to bring down their living
standards and to be satisfied with less.
In Korea, the relationship between the labor unions and
the companies is not as important as is in the United states
and other advanced countries. Such drastic labor activities
as street demonstrations, strikes, and sabotages are virtu-
ally not allowed in Korean society, since militant or
belligerent activities initiated with good purposes, as for
a pay raise or for better working conditions, are often
equated or related to destructive activities instigated by
North Korea. This perception, which may invite political
instability, is consequently not supported by the majority
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of Koreans. Accordingly, management of Korean business
firms recognizes the absolute necessity of political
stability for the sake of national defense, and is committed
to the maintenance of the social environment which provides
for that stability.
It is believed, however, that such adverse factors as
low wage levels and educational discrimination of employees
will be removed completely by the 1990's when the Korean
economy is expected to achieve a firmer foundation. Several
important characteristics of the management style of Korean
private enterprises will be discussed in detail in the
remainder of this chapter.
1 • The I mportance of 3 uman Relati onships
As discussed already, the disagreements and the
conflicts between the "traditional" ideas of most senior
managers who ascribe to the idea of vertical relationships
and the new ideas of most employees who believe in the prin-
ciple of equality, are said to have been an important aspect
of the Korean society since the 1950' s. The discord between
seniors and juniors has become an important issue for busi-
ness firms to solve. As a result, one of the primary goals
of private companies has been the- maintenance of smooth
relationships among employees.
As described above, Confucianism was characterized
by several factors such as unique relationships among family
members or members of a community, the absolute position of
the father as the head of the family and the respect the
other members of the family must show to the father. These
characteristics of Confuciansim pertaining to the family
constitution have been applied to private companies. The
chairman or the president who has the absolute power is
compared to the position of the father in the traditional
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family system. As each family member is expected to feel
honor and take pride in being family members, so too are the
employees of a company.
The Confucian principles that have been totally
accepted by Koreans for centuries strongly demand modest
attitudes and restraint in expressing one's opinion.
Accordingly, if an employee insists on his opinion in this
subtle environment and thus breaks the possible mood of
cooperation, he is likely to be considered a conceited man,
will probably earn a harmful reputation and may not be
selected for his next promotion.
No matter how brilliant his suggestion, he should be
aware of the time to withdraw his opinions whenever it
threatens the overridingly important concept of cooperation.
If he follows such invisible rules, he is recognized as a
well-educated man. Although the behavioral patterns may
cause material losses to the company as productive and bril-
liant ideas may be removed from consideration, his percep-
tive behavior as a member of the organization is still
highly praised and respected in Korean society.
Almost all educated employees of large Korean busi-
ness groups work very hard and try to make good impressions
on their influential seniors. It is not uncommon for an
ambitious employee in a Korean company to continue his work
after the regular duty hours without overtime pay.
It is said that after World Mar II, the Japanese
merely shifted the focus of their loyalty from Emperor to
employer [Ref. 26: p. 293]. This comment suggests that the
Japanese employees are loyal to their company. The Korean
employees, however, are said to be faithful not to their




In Korea, the importance of establishing order
between superior and inferior has been emphasized without
exception. Only those superiors who pay careful attention
to saving their subordinates' face and those inferiors who
make every efforts to maintain proper business and social
etiquette towards their superiors, are recognized as
gentlemen.
As the father is responsible in caring for all the
family members, some top managers seem to feel strong
responsibilities to each employee's individual affairs.
Examples of such expenses as for congratulations and condo-
lences, childrens' tuition fees, and expenses for group
activities during the employees' free time are not uncommon
and many Korean firms may pay a part or all of these
expenses.
Korean firms always pay attention to improvement and
maintenance of good relationships, not only among their own
employees, but also with the people outside their company.
The companies carry an anormous account and support the
external activities of their employees in the very broad
sense. Many employees at times drink with their personal
friends virtually at the company's expense. The company
pays the receipts returned by the employees after enter-
taining friends and associates at service organizations such
as night clubs, bars, or restaurants, without thorough
confirmations on the receipts. The firms seem to believe
that $100 expenditures of expense account bring $200
profits. The above statement is likely true as far as the
Korean business society is concerned.
An importance of human relations in the Korean busi-
ness firms is an traditional outcome of inveterate culture.
It is important for an employee of a Korean business firm to
maintain good relationships with the public officials in
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charge, the staff of the bank and other organizations with
which the company has many dealings. Particularly, good
relationships with public officals has been the most impor-
tant consideration from the company's standpoint. These
officials are the source of the information required to
establish the company's plan for ths current and long-term
operations. Therefore, integrity has been continuously
emphasized to the government-employees in Korea, where the
government's economic development plans have been driven for
two decades.
A number of former employees of the
government-controlled organizations are invited to middle or
high management positions of large companies after their
retirement from the government positions. They have easy
access to information sources requirsd by the companies for
years following their retirement because of their prior
positions as leaders of the public officials currently in
power.
2. Family Oriented Management
In many Korean business firms, a large number of the
direct family members or the close rslatives of the founders
and successors have participated in business operations.
They include the founder's brothers, sons, nephews, and
sons-in-law. Their powerful influences and exclusive
possession of the top management postions results in an
erosion of the non-family executives' will to work.
Therefore, a very limited number of such big business groups
as Samsung and Daewoo have strictly excluded the founder's
family members from management positions, and have given




Due to the short history of business operations,
most founders of Korean private enterprises still hold
absolute decision-making power over major company concerns.
In the several big firms when the absolute power of the
founders was transfered to their successors, the employees
have enjoyed less "traditional" pressures in human
relationships by the introduction of Western rationalism.
It is not uncommon for several big firms to maintain family
controlled ownership (vice public ownership) despite strong
pressure from the government for its abolition.
In the family-run company, most recommendations made
by a staff, after a reasonable analysis and a prudent study,
are usually accepted. Sometimes, however, the owner's
improvisatory idea is selscted instead of prudent sugges-
tions made by his staff. I n no case, however, can the deci-
sion made by the owner be challenged in the Korean society
where vertical relationships between superior and inferior
are still generally accepted by a majority of the people.
In most firms, the founders, who become the chairman
or the president, take an active part in the management.
They preside over the important meetings, encourage
employees to higher productivity, and make important deci-
sions on the company activities. In big Korean firms the
founder or his successor usually leaves the top management
responsibility of each of his subsidiary companies in the
hands of family members or other executives who have worked
in the company for a long period of time. The major issues
or plans of the subsidaries are, however, reported and
approved by the founder prior to any final decision-making.
There are few Korean business founders who allow
their senior level executives the management latitude neces-
sary for them to fully contribute to the business develop-
ment. Lucky, Hyosung, Sangyong, and Korean Explosive Group
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are the Korean business groups, the founders of which have
transferred their powers to their eldest sons successfully.
The younger brother of the founder of the Sunkyung group
took the top managerial r espondsibilities. And the top
managerial responsibilities for the Samsung group are
retained by the third son of the founder. At any rate, it
is important to know that the founders or their eldest sons
have assumed the top-managerial rssponsibilities of each
Korean business group without many exceptions.
3 • Appearance of the Y ounq Managers
The Korean managers are younger than those of any
other country. As a matter of fact, the majority of the
Korean business managers, including a large number of the
top managers, are in their late 40 ( s or early SO^. This is
largely due to the fact that the young military leaders, who
were largely in their early 40*3, assumed the administrative
responsibilities of the Korean government after the military
revolution in May 196 1.
In Korea, traditionally, high ranking government
officials have exercised powerful influence over business
firms. As high ranking positions of the government were
occupied by a group in their 40*s,. there was a new trend
where major positions in all fields in Korean society were
gradually filled by younger people. In addition, as the
economic development plans instituted by the new government
were successful, the expansion and creation boom of private
business firms continued, contributing to the accelerated
promotion of young employees to the postion of managers.
These young managers have greatly contributed not only to
the continuous expansion of business with their ambitious




In the process of learning their duties, these young
managers made many mistakes which resulted in extraordinary
losses to the companies and the nation, largely because of
their lack of experiences. However, it is believed that the
continued successful growth of the Korean economy might be
impossible without the ambition and enthusiasm of these
young managers.
Most of the young managers from the 1960*s have
maintained -their management positions and thus become
managers in their 50's in the 1970 's. As of the early
1980* s, the majority of Korean managers are in their late
40* s to early 50's.
It is felt that their efforts to achieve ceaseless
expansion of business operations will continue since the
Korean managers, who are generally younger than their
Japanese or Western counterparts, will be responsible for
the management of the country on the whole for a relatively
long period of time.
It is believed that the achievement of operational
goals is highly possible if the young managers carefully
analyze and evaluate the errors they committed during the
past 20 years and utilize the lessons in long-term planning.
The problems created by the Japanese economy as Japan became
one of the big economic powers in the world will be another
good source of knowledge that the Korean managers should
consider.
A noticeable tendency has appeared among elite
employees as the number of young managers has increased.
The tendency has been that they have been anxious to get
fast promotions without exerting maximum effort for a long
period of time. Individual efforts to get better reputa-
tions than their fellow-workers in a short period of time
sometimes brought discord and excessive competition among
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employees. Due to the influence of a long history of
poverty in Korea and the traditional values of Confucianism,
there are many young employees in both the government and
the private enterprises who have strong ambitions for
success. Most of them establish early promotion as one of
their life's goals at relatively young ages. Any organiza-
tion that hires a large number of aabitious young men will
be able to sustain fast growth if it successfully uses the
right man in the right place in a cooperative mood.
There is another reason for the Korean society to
have somewhat younger managers in almost all areas. It can
be explained by the social environment of Korea. Until the
end of World War II, only a few Korean teenagers had the
chance to receive regular school education. First, there
were not many schools available in Korea. Most high schools
and colleges were restricted to the Japanese students. The
Koreans who had higher education before World War II were
from families that either supported the Japanese coloni-
alism, cr were rich, or both. Accordingly, in the early
1960*3 when full-scale business activities started in Korea,
there were only a few candidates to replace the managers who
were in their 60* s or 70's and were qualified in terms of
experience and educational backgrounds. Most company
founders were born entrepreneurs and were in their 30 f s at
the time they founded their companies. Since the 1970»s,
the new demand for management positions in Korean firms was
filled by a group of elite employees who had joined the
companies through open examinations.
** • 2kj§ I nflu ence of Ex ternal Organ izations
In the social environment of Korea, the government
exercises an important influence on business operations. As
a result, companies to expect a lot of difficulties in
60

planning or operating the business, unless they coordinate
closely with the government. The only way to escape
extensive governmental influence is to expand the companies 1
influence across the whole country by growing into a
super-company. However, there is no way to grow into such a
big firm without a close relationship with the government.
Consequently, it can be said that the Korean government has
exercised strong influences over tha private sector for a
long time.
A short historical background of Korean firms will
be examined to help explain why the government's influence
over business companies has been so strong. Although it has
been over 30 years since entrepreneurial firms were estab-
lished in Korea, the full-scale activities and growth of
these companies did not start until the early 1960 , s with
the controls and support of the government in the form of
lowered taxes and interest-rates and government sponsoring
of the payments in a loan agreement with foreign banks.
As the firms were continuously growing with govern-
ment support, the scope of government control was also
gradually increased. This, naturally, resulted in reducing
the ability and will of the companies to support themselves.
Private firms often expected the government to solve their
problems before making efforts to find their own solutions.
As a result, the influence of the government over the
private sector became larger every year.
Recently the Korean government has made efforts to
reduce its intervention and control over private companies.
The government also urges them not to rely on government
supports. Government intervention has been limited to
recommending courses of action for business operations while
only occasionally specifically guiding and controling them
if necessary by providing or discontinuing various supports.
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No government officials have been allowed to participate in
the management of private companies.
The second consideration is the shortage of natural
resources. Korea (south) has 38.5 million people in its
small land space of 38.175 square miles. Futhermore, 70
percent of its total territory is a mountainous area. The
population density of Korea for the usable land spaces is,
therefore, one of the highest in the world. Overpopulation
has been, in effect, a very serious problem in Korea. The
Korean government has spent an enormous amount of money for
national defense every year (6 percent of the gross national
product) . In addition, Korea does not produce a single drop
of crude oil and also has only limited reserves of other
natural resources. Korea experiences almost 4 months of
bitter cold winter every year. [Hef. 22]. To overcome the
disadvantageous conditions listed above, the need for effec-
tive centralized control of the limited resources should be
strongly emphasized. The Korean government has assumed and
accomplished that role effectively since the early 1960's
The government, banks, and business associations for
each business area or industry are the external organiza-
tions that influence business operations. The government,
as a large stockholder, exercises its influence over the
banks and also influences the selection of the officers of
each business association. Therefore, close coordination
and good relations with the governement are extremely impor-
tant from a business standpoint. Accordingly, each firm
ceaselessly seeks to maintain good relations with the
government officials in charge of preparing new policies or
alterating existing policies that are related to the opera-
tions of the firm.
As the operational scales of the firms were
enlarged, the large firms were gradually endowed with the
62

capabilities to acquire required market information and to
raise funds. This has enabled them to obtain international
competitive powers and credits. Accordingly, the Korean
government not only initiated its efforts to reduce the
scope of its control over civilian firms, but also has urged




IV. A COMPARISON OF MANAGEMENT STYLE: JAPAN AND KOREA
A. A CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON
1 • 111® Effect of the S£r ead of Confucianism on
Modernizati on
Korea and Japan are basically Confucian states.
However, there is a very large gap between the two countries
with regard to the influence of Confucianism. Though Korea
acquired Confucianism from China, Korea was a much better
student of Confucianism than China in some respect. In
Japan, however, Confucianism never went beyond the realm of
academe. It did become to some extent a code of behavior
for the warrior class, but it did not enter into the daily
life of the peasant, artisan, or merchant class [Ref. 27:
p.56].
It is believed that the depth of penetration of
Confucianism in fact has greatly influenced modernization
and industrialization of these Asian countries.
Confucianism has conspicuously changed people*s outlook on
labor, particularly the value consciousness of physical
labor, public and private morals and principles of group
behavior. This perhaps provides the most crucial point of
view in examining differences in patterns of industrializa-
tion between Japan and Korea. If the two countries are
observed carefully, it is their heterogeneous nature rather
than their homogeneity which stands out.
2 . Warrior Rule and Civilian Rul
e
Japanese respect labor in a workshop environment.
It was derived from the notion that to earn a living by the
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sweat of one's brow is a virtue. They also jump at new
products, with little resistance on their part to consequent
changes in life style and habits. The respect given to
labor in the workshop in contemporary Japan has its roots in
the seven hundred years of continuous rule by the warrior
class. In Japan, where the military houses held the reins
of government for many centuries, the sword was valued more
than the pen. The foundation of military skills lies in
exercising the body. From this was born the notion of
making a virtue of the perspiring brow, and this in turn
shaped the values even of the ruling class or the upper
echelon cf society.
This tradition has been inherited by the corporate
world. Japanese corporations first assign many of the new
college graduates they hire to production divisions. In
particular, half of all new college recruits with science
and engineering degrees are assigned to production workshops
[Ref. 27: p. 58], This is significantly different from Korea
where most college recruits are put in administration and
planning. Japanese engineers walk around the plant wearing
hard hats, clumsy looking safety shoes, and sweaty, oil-
stained work clothes, but have a high status and a certain
amount of authority, and are not the least inferior to
research and planning personnel. this is different from the
situation in Korea and also in the West. That this respect
for work in the workshop has its roots in the warrior tradi-
tion will become apparent from a comparison with Korea which
has had a long history of civilian rule.
Korea was a country where civilian rule continued
nearly 2000 years. It placed the highest value on scholar-
ship and held the military arts to be of lesser importance.
Moreover, in Korea, class discrimination was also strong.
In the Yi dynasty, commerce and industry did not develop
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much and it was rare for the upper classes to bestir them-
selves or dirty their hands with work. In a society of this
nature, it was not possible for production by physical labor
to be highly valued by society. In modern-day Korea, people
still have no regard for physical labor in the workshop. A
good example of this is the wage differential between admin-
istrative and technological jobs in Korean firms.
Until recently, very few corporate managers had
science or engineering backgrounds. This is at least
partially attributable to the history of civilian rule.
Furthermore, the founders of these corporations are being
replaced by second-generation managers who also seem to have
few science or engineering backgrounds. This is representa-
tive of the differences with Japan.
3 • Int uitive Japan, Loqica 1 Koraa
In Japan, there is an old saying that goes, "Before
you exercise the mind, first exercise the body." This is
"experientialism": Through the experience of working with
the hands and body, intuition was nurtured. The Japanese
with their sentimental thoughts and habits do not seem to
care for a logical atmosphere. From ancient times the
virtue of intuition stored up through the repeated experi-
ence of working in person, rather than the logical use of
mind, has been one of the special features of Japanese
technology.
In contrast, the Koreans have a strong tendency to
prefer logic. Their national character is such that if they
are not logically convinced they will not act. This aspect
of the Korean national character is cited as a cause for
Korean having lagged bshind in modernization during the
mid -nineteenth century. In contrast to Korea, Japan raced




Koreans are also said to tend to place concepts
before facts. Their logical bent as well as their ideal-
istic inclination was something over which the five
hundred-year long history of sluggish civilian rule of the
Yi dynasty cast a deep shadow, and it was also greatly
influenced by the lag in the development of commerce and
industry during that period.
Japanese are said to have high regard for pains-
taking work. Instead of thinking logically of the standards
of product quality and performance and attempting to realize
them through economic rationality, the Japanese attitude is
still to produce high quality by asking no questions and not
skimping on the work. Taking high quality to be a matter of
course, they afterwards concentrate their work on how to
produce it cheaply. The high quality of Japanese industrial
goods is said to be derived from the age-old tradition of
putting one's soul into one's art or skill.
These characteristics that greatly contributed to
the amazing growth of the Japanese sconomy are seldom found
in Korea. Quality improvements and the enhancement of busi-
ness morality remained as the most important and urgent
issues to be solved in Korea.
* • D ifferences in Approach to the Group: Kinfolk vs
F eu d al Domain
The Japanese have an established reputation for
effective group work with outstanding results. Group
behavior requires exceedingly great effort and compulsory
power in order for the group to begin moving in an orderly
manner in the same direction. In countries where individu-
alism is especially strong, it is difficult to sacrifice the
self and get in step with the group. Group behavior in
Japan is orderly and alert. The Japanese habit of not
thinking logically surely plays a large part in this.
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Both the Koreans and the Japanese seem to agree that
"the Japanese excel at organizational ability and, as a
group, demonstrate unsurpassed effectiveness, while Koreans
have a weak spirit of unity and as a group they are
inferior."
The first point that may be raised is that the
Koreans are rather self-assertive and often dissent smong
themselves. The Japanese are said to be comparatively
devoid of self-assertion and dissension. There are, of
course, fairly strong groupistic tendencies in Korea.
However, the makeup of the group is different. In the case
of Korea, as already discussed in the previous chapter, in
blood-related groups such as the family or kinship circles,
group consciousness is strong to a degree not found else-
where. Further, community consciousness is also guite
strong. In short, the difference with Japan is in the
Korean orientation toward small groups. In the seventeenth
century, the domain system of local decentralization was
established throughout Japan. This development weakened the
consciousness of kinship in the family and narrowed its
sphere, while the focus of groupism was shifted to the
domain. In Japan today, group consciousness of the domain
has been transferred to the corporation. In Korea, on the
other hand, a centralized system of rule was continued until
the modernization period of the late nineteenth century with
no underpinning of mid-level organizations. Only small-scale
kinship groups existed.
5. The C oncepts of Pub lie and Private
Japan drew a hard distinction between what was
public and what was private. And it gave absolute priority
to the public. Japanese selfless service exercised during




Confucianism, in contrast, takes the kinship system
to be a fundamental ethic. Public and private matters are
often not clearly distinguished but become confused in
Confucian societies. As discussed earlier, nepotic manage-
ment is a salient feature of some Korean corporations. The
old category of kinship was expanded to groups of the same
background such as the same birthplace, same school, and
same religion. It is believed that some Korean workers have
not yet identified themselves with the corporation.
Accordingly, not many workers for Korean firms seem to have
a spirit of loyalty to their companies.
B. DIFFERENCES OF MANAGEMENT STYLE
In studying the management style of the two countries,
Japan and Korea, we did not find many characteristics that
both countries have in common. The two societies had
existed rather independently for a long period of time until
the twentieth century despite their geographical proximity.
However, Confucian influences over both countries seemed to
provide, to some extent, the basis for similiarity in the
behavior of the two people. The degree of dissimiliarities
in behavioral patterns between Koreans and Japanese is
believed to be, if any, much less than that between Koreans
and Westerners. The basic differences in management style
between the two countries are thought to be as follows.
First, in the Japanese corporations, the influence of
the government is not as strong as in the Korean corpora-
tions. Many Japanese corporations were able to develop with
some basic support from the government through the long
period of over one hundred years during which most other
countries, including the advanced European countries and the
United States, were not ready to impede Japanese progress
for the purpose of protecting their own industries. When
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they started to feel threat from the Japanese economic
growth which was accomplished quietly and rapidly, Japan had
already become a large economic power surpassing both France
and Germany. The big corporations of Japan have relied more
on their creative efforts and effective management than on
government supports in achieving their growth.
In contrast, the Korean enterprises have been, in some
respects, under government influence. If there is a "Korea,
Inc.," as there is alleged to be a "Japan, Inc.," it is the
government that is the chairman of the board of the corpora-
tion. In Korea, the necessity for effective management by
the government of limited resources has been increased due
to the heavy burden of defense expenditures. Each corpora-
tion also needed strong supports from the government to cope
with the protective trade tendencies of other countries and
to raise funds for the operation and expansion of the compa-
nies. These factors eventually resulted in government
interventions into the firms activities. Currently,
however, government influence has been declining because of
the governments efforts to decrease its influence over the
private sector.
The second difference is in the evaluation systems. In
Japanese firms, an employee is not given his first formal
evaluation or opportunity for promotion until after ten
years of employment. In contrast, a Korean worker usually
has his first opportunity for formal promotion after about
five years of service. As a result, some Korean employees
can be promoted to the position of executive while in their
40s. In Japanese firms, however, the same chance is usually
given to most employees in their late 50s.
As a result of the promotion practices discussed above,
some Korean employees are more interested in those things
which bring immediate results. This has resulted in a lack
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of concern for the long-term view which is an essential
element in performing the managerial job. These managers
are often concerned about makeshift arrangements in lieu of
fundamental solutions. This short-term evaluation system
also has positive aspects in some respects. It provides
vitality to the internal atmosphare of the firms and
enhances the morale of the prospective managers.
Third, there are differences in the decision making
process. In Japanese firms, a formal proposal is written
and then circulated from the bottom of the organization to
the top. At each stage, the manager in guestion signifies
his agreement by affixing his seal to the document. At the
end of this process, the proposal is literally covered with
the stamps of approval of sixty to eighty people.
On the other hand, the decision tnaking process in Korean
firms is similiar to American practices. It is a top-down
style, not a bottom-up process. Suggestions for new
projects are usually proposed by the management. The
proposal is improved during the approval process through a
chain of command so as to be favored by top management.
Fourth, Japanese permanent employment and seniority
systems are well-known practices of employment. These
systems are also basically supported by both labor and
management in Korean firms. Most Korean workers do not want
to shift their jobs if conditions permit. The same is also
true on the management side . However, permanent employment
and seniority systems still have a weak base in Korean busi-
ness society. The main reason for that is derived from the
economic conditions in Korea as a whole. The Korean economy
has been developing at a comparatively fast speed. But more
jobs need to be created, better guality products need to be
produced, and productivity needs to be enhanced. By the
1990s, when Korea successfully improves the living standards
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of its people and also has enough people in the middle-class
income level, it is believed that the gap between current





The management styles of the two countries, except for
the four facts previously discussed, seem to be similar in a
broad sense. Although similar cultural backgrounds and
geographical proximity between the two countries and
Japanese colonial rule have resulted in strong Japanese
influence over Korean business practices, American
management style will also significantly influence Korean
management style in the future. Of course, Korean business
society will form its own management style in the long run
which will probably be a more Japanese-oriented style in
most respects.
The origin of Korea 1 s fast economic growth is not
believed to be through innovative management techniques as
was true in the Japanese case. Again, it is not due to the
satisfactory conditions of international economic
environments. It was only possible because of the strong
will and diligence of the Korean people along with
appropriate supports and effective controls by the
government
.
Korean businessmen have succesfully maintained an
acceptable growth rate for their companies by struggling
with numerous adversities such as protectionism and tariff
barriers in foreign trade. They are believed to be able to
achieve continuous growth by their efforts to develop
strategic commodities and tc produce super-quality goods or
to export production goods.
With a continuing effort to obtain external growth, each
Korean firm has tried to consolidate the internal aspects of
management. However, it does not seem to be easy for a
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company to get the desired results in a short period of
time. Contributing to this difficulty have been the
traditional factors in effect for several hundred years.
Certainly, this issue has been gradually improved, and will
take more time for a complete solution.
Though Korean businessmen inwardly envy the wonderful
success of the Japanese economy, they make ceaseless efforts
to escape getting such a dishonorable reputation as an
"economic animal." They are believed to try to follow the
lessons obtained from the mistakes the Japanese committed
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